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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper seeks to determine if moving from a no-fault auto insurance system to a tort system will 
necessarily result in hospitals being faced with more unpaid bills. The answer is found to depend 
upon legal regulation of the medical insurance industry, the percent of drivers operating without 
auto insurance, the proportion of drivers who are without medical insurance and the percent of 
drivers who purchase Med Pay.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 hospital usually collects only a few cents on a dollar’s worth of care for patients who have no 
insurance. As a result, hospitals are very concerned about any change that would increase the 
percent of uninsured patients they treat. This paper seeks to determine if moving from a no-fault 
auto insurance system to a tort system will necessarily result in hospitals being faced with more unpaid bills.  
 
The medical community in general has supported no-fault auto insurance and opposed tort. This could be 
due to the belief, rightly or wrongly held, that a tort system results in a higher proportion of those injured in auto 
accidents being without insurance to cover the cost of their injuries. However, there are other potential explanations 
for the medical community’s support of no-fault that this paper also reviews.  
 
This paper takes a probabilistic approach to determining whether moving from a no-fault system to a tort 
system must, necessarily, result in an increase in unpaid hospital bills. Under certain conditions it is found that such 
a transition can actually reduce the proportion of uninsured patients. Sensitivity analysis confirms these results 
within the bounds of realistic parameters.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Under a tort liability auto insurance system (also known as “third party insurance”), responsibility for the 
accident must be determined. Then the at-fault driver’s insurance company will pay for the medical bills sustained 
by the other driver up to the limits of the policy. Under a no-fault system (also known as “first party insurance”), 
economic damages from injuries sustained in an auto accident are covered by each party’s own insurance. This self-
insurance is referred to as personal injury protection (PIP).  
 
States determine under which auto insurance system they wish to operate. As of 1998, thirty-seven states 
operated under a tort auto insurance regime, ten states operated under no-fault laws and three states were classified 
as choice states.
1
 Choice states allow each driver to choose whether (s)he wishes to purchase tort insurance or no-
fault insurance.  
 
All states currently operating under a no-fault regime converted to this system between 1971 and 1976. No 
state has adopted no-fault since 1976. The primary impetus for moving to no-fault seems to have been high 
insurance premiums (Harrington, 1994). The states that opted for no-fault also had a higher population density, 
                                                 
1
 As of 1998 the no-fault states were: Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota. 
The choice states were: Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  
A 
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higher real per capita income, and fewer rural vehicle miles traveled per total vehicle miles traveled than the states 
that remained under a tort regime (Loughran, 2001). At the time, no-fault was regarded as a system which would 
speed up payments and lead to more equitable compensation than occurred under a tort system (Schmit and Yeh, 
2003). 
  
There are four states that operated under a no-fault system that have since chosen to revert to tort status:  
Connecticut (no-fault, 1973-1993), Georgia (no-fault, 1975-1991), and Nevada (no-fault, 1974-1980). In 2003 
Colorado moved from a no-fault regime to a tort regime.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are some papers, based on the economic theory of regulation, which study the special interest groups 
affected by moving from one auto insurance system to another. Members of the medical community are among 
these special interest groups. Harrington (1994) considers the time period that states were adopting no-fault (1971 to 
1976). He finds that the probability that a state moved from tort to no-fault is higher in states that had a greater 
number of physicians per capita. However, when Regan (2001) studies Pennsylvania, a choice state, she finds no 
relationship between the selection of the no-fault option at the county level and the proportion of the population that 
works in the medical field.  
 
Cummins and Tennyson (1992) observe that no-fault regimes often provide broader and more generous 
medical benefits than do tort regimes. As a result, non-traditional medical providers (chiropractors, aroma therapists, 
etc.) will frequently find their services are reimbursable under a no-fault system but not under a tort system. Under 
these circumstances it is to be expected that non-traditional medical providers will be opposed to any insurance 
system other than no-fault.  
 
Traditional health care providers also like the generous medical benefits associated with no-fault. In 
addition, because no-fault insurance decreases the uncertainty associated with payment for care rendered (Regan, 
2001) it tends to be favored by medical care professionals. No-fault insurance is often perceived as speeding up the 
payment process because determination of fault is unnecessary. Although this may not, in fact, be the case, (Schmit 
and Yeh, 2003) the perception can bias a health care community in favor of no-fault insurance.  
 
Ma and Schmit (2000) find that, controlling for average premium size and other relevant variables, no-fault 
states have higher levels of uninsured motorists. In a no-fault state, auto insurance will not pay for the medical bills 
of an uninsured motorist who is injured in an auto accident regardless of who is at fault. In a tort state, auto 
insurance will pay for the injuries sustained by an uninsured driver if the at-fault driver is insured. Insured drivers 
who carry uninsured motorist coverage will be covered by their auto insurance in an accident caused by an 
uninsured motorist. So, under a no-fault system, there are both more uninsured motorists and more categories of 
uninsured drivers (both at-fault and not-at-fault) whose injuries will not be covered by auto insurance. Although the 
medical community usually opposes moving from no-fault to tort insurance, the result of such a shift is not 
necessarily an increase in unpaid medical bills.  
 
The analysis in this paper assumes that there are no more drivers injured in auto accidents as a result of 
operating under one auto insurance system than another. However, some have claimed that no-fault insurance 
removes accountability and, as a result, will increase accident rates. There is a long literature (Bruce, 1984; Devlin, 
1992; Kochanowski & Young, 1984; Landes, 1982; Loughran, 2001; McEwin, 1989; Zador, 1986) which attempts 
to empirically determine whether no-fault insurance does increase driver negligence. The literature is not conclusive. 
The most recent and thorough approach is found in Loughran (2001). He finds no evidence that the adoption of no-
fault auto insurance increases auto accident fatalities, the state’s accident rate, or the driver negligence rate.  
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
When determining whether hospitals will be faced with more unpaid debt as a result of moving from a no-
fault system to a tort system, all four types of accidents must be considered: 
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 Insured driver hits insured driver 
 Uninsured driver hits uninsured driver 
 Uninsured driver hits insured driver 
 Insured driver hits uninsured driver 
 
Those who claim transitioning from no-fault to tort will necessarily lead to more unpaid hospital bills may 
be considering only the first type of accident: insured hitting insured. If this was the only type of accident to occur 
then hospitals would, unambiguously, lose as a result of moving to a tort regime. But it is estimated that 15% of 
drivers in the U.S. are uninsured (Ma and Schmit, 2000). Thus, around 28% of auto accidents involve at least one 
uninsured driver.  
 
We also must consider whether there is a probabilistic relationship between choosing to drive without auto 
insurance and having no medical insurance. That is, if we know an individual has no auto insurance does that make 
him any more likely than a member of the general population to be without medical insurance? We will consider 
two extreme, “bookend” cases: 
 
 Case 1: we will assume total independence. That is, knowing that an individual has no auto insurance 
makes him no more or less likely than a member of the general population to have medical insurance. 
 Case 2: we will assume absolute dependence. That is, if we know a driver does not carry auto insurance 
then we also know that he does not have medical insurance.  
 
There are two different legal conditions we will consider as well: 
 
 Medical insurers deny the claims of those without auto insurance who were involved in auto accidents. 
 Medical insurers pay for the injuries sustained by those without auto insurance who were injured in auto 
accidents.  
 
Which of these conditions pertain depends on state law. For example, in 1998 Colorado health insurers 
became required by law to provide coverage for the injuries sustained in auto accidents by their members who did 
not have auto insurance. Prior to that point in time, it was common to find health insurance policies that excluded 
injuries sustained in an auto accident. This exclusion minimized the health premiums of law-abiding customers. 
Recall that, in the 1990s, Colorado was a no-fault state. As a result, any driver who obeyed the law and purchased 
auto insurance had coverage for medical injuries (s)he sustained in an auto accident. A medical insurance provider 
who paid for the medical bills resulting from an auto accident would be requiring all of its subscribers to pay a 
higher premium to cover the medical bills of those who chose to disobey the law and drive without insurance.  
 
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 (pgs. 13-15) consider all of the above mentioned factors. The results demonstrate that 
moving from no-fault to tort insurance need not necessarily result in an increase in unpaid hospital bills. 
Approximate parameter values for Colorado are included so that the resulting magnitude of the changes can be 
gauged.  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we seek to gauge by how much a single variable would have to change in order to change the 
results calculated for our representative state, Colorado. This analysis is presented on pages 10-12. 
 
Scenario 1: considers a system where there is no relationship between the choice to purchase auto insurance and 
having medical insurance and where medical insurers are allowed to exclude any injuries suffered in an auto 
accident. 
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According to the Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association, about 25% of drivers in Colorado 
chose to purchase Med Pay insurance
2
 when the state reverted to a tort system. If this number goes down over time 
the gains to the health care system from changing from no-fault to tort will decline. However, even if absolutely no 
one purchased Med Pay (i.e. if P5 went to one), the health care system would not be hurt from moving from no-fault 
to tort.  National estimates of the percent of the population without medical insurance hover around 15%. If the 
probability that a driver does not have private medical insurance falls from the initial assumed value of 20% to 15% 
then the gains to the health care system from moving from no-fault to tort increase. However, ceteris paribus, if 
27% or more of the population did not have private medical insurance then the health care system would be faced 
with more unpaid bills as a result of moving from no-fault to tort.  When Colorado was a no-fault state, estimates of 
the fraction of drivers without auto insurance hovered around 20%. However, if this number fell to the national 
average (15%), the gains to the health care system from moving from no-fault to tort vanish.  Given the 
circumstances of Scenario 1, the medical system will gain as a result of transition from no-fault to tort within all 
reasonable parameters for Med Pay and the percent of the population which does not have medical insurance. 
However, relatively small and plausible changes in the percent of drivers without auto insurance could lead to an 
increase in unpaid hospital bills.   
 
Scenario 2: assumes that medical insurers are forced, by law, to pay the claims of those without auto insurance that 
are injured in car accidents and that there is no relationship between the choice to purchase auto insurance and 
having medical insurance. 
 
Under these circumstances, if 80% of the drivers carried Med Pay then the health care system would not be 
hurt by the transition from no-fault to tort. But, if any fewer drivers choose to carry Med Pay (recall that only 25% 
of drivers purchased Med Pay in Colorado), then hospitals will be faced with more unpaid bills as a result of the 
auto insurance regime change.  An increase in the percent of consumers with medical insurance will decrease the 
size of the unpaid bills with which hospitals are faced. However, only if everyone had medical insurance, would the 
health care system not be hurt by transitioning from no-fault to tort.  An increase in the percent of drivers with auto 
insurance will make the transition from no-fault to tort more costly for hospitals. If less than 25% of drivers were 
insured, well out of the real-world bounds, only then would the health care system gain from transitioning from tort 
to no-fault.  Given the circumstances of Scenario 2, the health care system is, within all reasonable parameters, hurt 
by the transition from a no-fault system to tort.  
 
Scenario 3:  assumes that all of those who do not carry auto insurance are also without medical insurance. 
 
Under these circumstances, even if no one carried Med Pay, the health care system would still gain from 
transitioning from no-fault to tort.  If more than 33% of the population did not have medical insurance then the 
health care system would be hurt by the auto insurance regime change. However, real world, nationwide, estimates 
of those lacking medical insurance are half this value.  If more than 86% of the population had auto insurance then 
the health care system would lose as a result of moving from no-fault to tort.  Given the circumstances of Scenario 3, 
the medical system will gain as a result of transition from no-fault to tort within all reasonable parameters for Med 
Pay and the percent of the population which does not have medical insurance. However, relatively small and 
plausible changes in the percent of drivers without auto insurance could lead to an increase in unpaid hospital bills.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the medical community has generally supported no-fault auto insurance and opposed tort, it is not 
necessarily true that moving from a no-fault regime to a tort system would increase the size of unpaid bills faced by 
hospitals. What happens to the proportion of uninsured patients served by hospitals as the result of such a shift 
depends upon a myriad of factors. These factors include: (a) the proportion of drivers under a tort system that choose 
Med Pay (b) the proportion of drivers with medical insurance (c) the state law regarding whether medical insurers 
                                                 
2 Med Pay is an optional insurance which drivers who operate under a tort system may purchase. It is first party insurance. That is, its function 
is similar to personal injury protection under a no-fault system. Med Pay will pay for any medical costs sustained by the insured driver in an auto 
accident up to the limit of the policy. 
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can exclude injuries sustained by drivers without auto insurance (d) the relationship between choosing to drive 
without auto insurance and being without medical insurance (e) the proportion of drivers without auto insurance (f) 
the relationship between the proportion of drivers without auto insurance and the auto insurance regime of the state.  
 
Both scenarios 1 and 3 were found to be sensitive to relatively small upward changes in the percent of 
drivers with auto insurance. In all of the scenarios it was assumed that the percent of drivers with and without car 
insurance is not affected by moving from a no-fault regime to a tort regime. However, the work of Ma and Schmit 
(2000) suggests that no-fault states have more uninsured drivers than do tort states. Table 1 (pg. 13) considers the 
outcomes of all three scenarios when it is assumed that the percent of uninsured drivers is higher in no-fault regimes. 
Under these circumstances, moving from a no-fault system to a tort system either increases the gains to the medical 
system or decreases the loss.  
 
Although this paper used Colorado as a representative state, any other state could use this same framework 
to determine, a priori, if changing auto insurance regimes would result in an increase in unpaid hospital bills.  
 
Variable Definitions 
 
P1= probability insured hits insured  
P2 = probability uninsured hits uninsured 
P3 = probability uninsured hits insured 
P4 = probability insured hits uninsured 
P5 = probability at-fault, insured, driver does not have Med Pay 
P6 = probability at fault driver does not have private medical insurance 
X = number of cars involved in crashes where occupant(s) require medical care 
Y = average cost of treating auto injuries per car 
 
Med Pay: an optional insurance which drivers who operate under a tort system may purchase. It is first 
party insurance. That is, its function is similar to personal injury protection under a no-fault system. Med Pay will 
pay for any medical costs sustained by the insured driver in an auto accident up to the limit of the policy. 
 
Estimates of these values for Colorado (1998) 
 
80% of cars are insured, 20% are uninsured 
P1= probability insured hits insured = (.8)(.8) = .64 
P2 = probability uninsured hits uninsured = (.2)(.2) = .04 
P3 = probability uninsured hits insured = (.2)(.8) = .16 
P4 = probability insured hits uninsured = (.8)(.2) = .16 
P5 = probability at-fault driver, insured, driver does not have Med Pay (2003) = .75 
P6 = probability at-fault driver does not have private medical insurance = .2 
X = number of cars involved in crashes where occupant(s) require medical care = 52,990 
Y = average cost of treating auto injuries per car = $7,800 
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Scenario 1: 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Independence: no relationship between whether an individual carries auto insurance and whether they have 
medical insurance. 
2. Medical insurers deny the claims of those without auto insurance who were involved in auto accidents. 
 
 
Gains to Health Care System from Shifting from No-Fault to Tort 
 
 No-Fault Tort Results 
Insured hits Insured PIP pays all bills The at-fault driver’s liability 
will cover the injuries of the 
other party. If the at-fault 
driver has neither Med Pay 
nor private med insurance he 
will impose a cost on the 
health care system 
(P1)(P5)( P6)(X)(Y) = 
health care system loss from 
shifting to Tort 
 
Uninsured hits Uninsured Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Medical insurance will deny 
claims b/c of lack of auto 
insurance. 
Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Medical insurance will deny 
claims b/c of lack of auto 
insurance. 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Uninsured hits Insured; 
uninsured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. Uninsured has no PIP 
and medical insurance will 
deny claims b/c of lack of 
auto insurance.  
Insured driver has UM 
coverage. Uninsured driver 
won’t be covered via 
medical insurance b/c he has 
no auto insurance. 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Insured hits uninsured; 
insured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. Uninsured won’t be 
covered via medical 
insurance b/c he has no auto 
insurance 
If the insured driver has 
neither Med Pay nor private 
med insurance then (s)he 
will impose a cost on the 
health care system. 
Uninsured will be covered 
under the insured’s liability 
(P4)(X)(Y) - 
(P4)(P5)(P6)(X)(Y) = health 
care system gain from 
shifting to tort 
Total   Health care system gain from 
shifting to tort = (P4)(X)(Y) - 
(P4)(P5)(P6)(X)(Y) - (P1)(P5)( 
P6)(X)(Y) =  
XY[P4 – (P4P5P6) – (P1P5P6)] 
This value will be positive if 
P4 > P5P6(P4 + P1) 
For Colorado, under these 
circumstances, the health 
care system gain would 
approximated be 
$16,532,880 
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Scenario 2: 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Independence: no relationship between whether an individual carries auto insurance and whether they have 
medical insurance. 
2. Medical insurers pay the claims of those without auto insurance who were involved in auto accidents. 
 
 
Costs Imposed on Health Care System from Shifting from No-Fault to Tort 
 
 No-Fault Tort Results 
Insured hits Insured PIP pays all bills The at-fault driver’s liability 
will cover the injuries of the 
other party. If the at-fault 
driver has neither Med Pay 
or private med insurance he 
will impose a cost on the 
health care system 
(P1)(P5)( P6)(X)(Y) = 
health care system loss from 
shifting to Tort 
 
Uninsured hits Uninsured Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Medical insurance will pay 
claims for those who have it. 
Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Medical insurance will pay 
claims for those who have it 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Uninsured hits Insured; 
uninsured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. Uninsured driver will be 
covered by med insurance if 
(s)he has it.  
Insured driver has UM 
coverage. Uninsured driver 
will be covered by med 
insurance if (s)he has it. 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Insured hits uninsured; 
insured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. Uninsured will be 
covered via medical 
insurance if (s)he has it. 
If the insured driver has 
neither Med Pay nor private 
med insurance then (s)he 
will impose a cost on the 
health care system. 
Uninsured will be covered 
under the insured’s liability 
(P4)(P6)(X)(Y) - 
(P4)(P5)(P6)(X)(Y) = health 
care system gain from 
shifting to tort 
Total   Health care system gain from 
shifting to tort = 
(P4)(P6)(X)(Y) - 
(P4)(P5)(P6)(X)(Y) - (P1)(P5)( 
P6)(X)(Y) =  
XY[P4P6 – (P4P5P6) – 
(P1P5P6)] 
This value will be positive if 
P4P6 > P5P6(P4 + P1) 
For Colorado, the health care 
system loss is approximated 
to be $36,372,336 
 
Scenario 3: 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Perfect dependence: anyone who doesn’t carry auto insurance also does not have medical insurance 
2. It does not matter whether medical insurers deny or cover the claims of those without auto insurance who 
were involved in auto accidents. 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2005                                                   Volume 3, Number 2 
 18 
Costs Imposed on Health Care System from Shifting from No-Fault to Tort 
 
 No-Fault Tort Results 
Insured hits Insured PIP pays all bills The at-fault driver’s liability 
will cover the injuries of the 
other party. If the at-fault 
driver has neither Med Pay 
or private med insurance he 
will impose a cost on the 
health care system 
(P1)(P5)( P6)(X)(Y) = 
health care system loss from 
shifting to Tort 
 
Uninsured hits Uninsured Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Since they don’t have auto 
insurance we know neither 
has medical insurance  
Both are uninsured so 
medical costs won’t be 
covered via auto insurance. 
Since they don’t have auto 
insurance we know neither 
has medical insurance 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Uninsured hits Insured; 
uninsured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. We know uninsured 
driver won’t be covered by 
med insurance since (s)he 
doesn’t have auto insurance.  
Insured driver has UM 
coverage. We know 
uninsured driver won’t be 
covered by med insurance 
since (s)he doesn’t have auto 
insurance. 
Health care system neither 
gains nor loses from shifting 
to Tort 
Insured hits uninsured; 
insured @ fault 
Insured driver covered by 
PIP. We know uninsured 
driver won’t be covered by 
med insurance since (s)he 
doesn’t have auto insurance. 
The insured driver will have 
med insurance since (s)he 
has auto insurance. 
Uninsured will be covered 
under the insured’s liability 
(P4)(X)(Y) = health care 
system gain from shifting to 
tort 
Total   Health care system gain from 
shifting to tort =  
(P4)(X)(Y) - (P1)(P5)( 
P6)(X)(Y)= 
XY[P4 – (P1P5P6)] 
This value will be positive if 
P4 > P1P5P6 
For Colorado, the health care 
system gain is approximated 
to be $26,452,608 
 
 
Scenario 1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Independence: no relationship between whether an individual carries auto insurance and whether they have 
medical insurance. 
2. Medical insurers deny the claims of those without auto insurance who were involved in auto accidents. 
 
row prob. insured prob. unins. p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p5p6(p4 + p1) gap
1 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.2 0.12 0.04
2 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.95 0.2 0.152 0.008
3 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 1 0.2 0.16 0
4 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.15 0.09 0.07
5 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.27 0.162 -0.002
6 0.85 0.15 0.7225 0.0225 0.1275 0.1275 0.75 0.2 0.1275 0
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gap = p4 - p5p6(p4 + p1); if the gap is positive then the health care system gains from moving to tort  
row 1: baseline         
row 2: increase p5 (prob. at-fault driver does not have Med Pay) RESULT: gap narrows   
row 3: set p5 (prob. at-fault driver does not have Med Pay) equal to 1. RESULT: gap equals zero  
row 4: decrease p6 (prob. at fault driver does not have med insurance: 15% is the national average) RESULT: gap grows 
row 5: increase p6 (prob. at fault driver does not have med insurance) to 27% RESULT: gap becomes negative 
row 6: increase probability insured (85% is the national average) RESULT: gap drops to zero   
 
Scenario 2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Independence: no relationship between whether an individual carries auto insurance and whether they have 
medical insurance. 
2. Medical insurers pay the claims of those without auto insurance who were involved in auto accidents. 
 
gap = p4p6 - p5p6(p4 + p1); if the "gap" is negative then the health care system loses from switching from NF to tort    
row 1: baseline            
row 2: decrease p5 (prob. at-fault driver does not have Med Pay) RESULT: gap drops to zero    
row 3: decrease p6 (prob. at fault driver does not have med insurance: 15% is the national average) RESULT: gap narrows: 
health care system faces smaller losses 
row 4: decrease P6 (prob. at-fault driver does not have med insurance) to zero. RESULT: gap drops to zero     
row 5: increase probability insured (85% is the national average) RESULT: gap widens: health care system faces larger losses    
row 6: decrease probability insured to 25%. RESULT: gap goes to zero        
 
Scenario 3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Assumptions: 
 
1. Perfect dependence: anyone who doesn’t carry auto insurance also does not have medical insurance 
2. It does not matter whether medical insurers deny or cover the claims of those without auto insurance who 
were involved in auto accidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
row prob. insured prob. unins. P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 p5p6(p4 + p1) gap
1 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.2 0.12 -0.088
2 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.2 0.2 0.032 0
3 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.15 0.09 -0.066
4 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0 0 0
5 0.85 0.15 0.7225 0.0225 0.1275 0.1275 0.75 0.2 0.1275 -0.102
6 0.25 0.75 0.0625 0.5625 0.1875 0.1875 0.75 0.2 0.0375 0
row prob. insured prob. unins. P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 p1p5p6 gap
1 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.2 0.096 0.064
2 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 1 0.2 0.128 0.032
3 0.8 0.2 0.64 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.75 0.33 0.1584 0.0016
4 0.87 0.13 0.7569 0.0169 0.1131 0.1131 0.75 0.2 0.113535 -0.000435
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gap = p4 - p1p5p6; if the gap is positive then the health care system gains from moving from no-fault to tort      
row 1: baseline             
row 2: increase p5 (prob. at-fault driver does not have Med Pay) RESULT: gap narrows: health care system gains less than 
before from transition   
row 3: increase p6 (prob. at fault driver does not have med insurance: 15% is the national average) RESULT: gap shrinks: 
health care system gains less from transition 
row 4: increase probability insured (85% is the national average) RESULT: gap becomes negative       
 
Table 1 
 
Assuming the percent of uninsured drivers is higher under no-fault than under tort implies: P1NF < P1T, P2NF > P2T, P3NF > P3T, and 
P4NF > P4T. 
 
 Assuming no change in the percent of uninsured 
drivers as the system moves from no-fault to tort 
(from previous analysis) 
Assuming the percent of uninsured drivers is 
higher under no-fault 
Scenario 1 Health care system gain from shifting to tort =   
XY[P4 – (P4P5P6) – (P1P5P6)] 
Health care system gain from shifting to tort =   
XY[P4NF – (P4TP5P6) – (P1TP5P6)] 
Scenario 2 Health care system gain from shifting to tort =  
XY[P4P6 – (P4P5P6) – (P1P5P6)] 
(This is a negative number for all reasonable P 
values) 
Health care system gain from shifting to tort =  
XY[P4NFP6 – (P4TP5P6) – (P1TP5P6)] 
(This is a smaller negative number for all reasonable 
P values) 
Scenario 3 Health care system gain from shifting to tort =  
XY[P4 – (P1P5P6)] 
Health care system gain from shifting to tort =  
XY[P4NF – (P1TP5P6)] 
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